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On June 24, 2004, the United States Supreme Court held
in Blakely v. Washington1 that Blakely’s Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury had been violated because the facts the
sentencing judge relied upon to impose an exceptional
sentence of ninety months (an upward departure from the
presumptive sentence range of forty-nine to fifty-three
months under Washington’s sentencing guidelines) had
neither been admitted by Blakely nor found by a jury. The
decision cast doubt on the constitutionality of the United
States sentencing guidelines and led to an expedited hearing by the Supreme Court and its decision in Booker and
Fanfan,2 confirming that the federal guidelines are indeed
subject to the Blakely ruling. The reasoning of Justice
Stevens’ and Breyer’s “majority” opinions in Booker also
strongly implied that the legally binding guidelines
adopted in Minnesota and several other states are likewise
covered by Blakely, and Minnesota courts had so ruled
even before Booker.3
Blakely has been likened to a legal earthquake or
tsunami, and some observers predicted that the decision
would have huge impacts on existing state sentencing
guidelines systems. In her dissent, Justice O’Connor identified nine states whose sentencing regimes were cast into
doubt under Blakely and commented that “over 20 years of
sentencing reform are all but lost.”4 The Vera Institute of
Justice identified nineteen states with sentencing guidelines or other presumptive-sentencing laws that seemed to
be affected by Blakely, and thirteen states—including Minnesota—whose guidelines systems would be
fundamentally affected.5 However, the Vera report argued
that Blakely’s effects would vary by state and would generally be less than some first expected, because “unlike the
federal system, [state] judicial fact-finding is used in only a
small fraction of cases.” 6
In September 2004 the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines Commission issued a report on Blakely’s
impact on Minnesota sentencing.7 The Commission concluded that Blakely would apply only to upward
departures and estimated that of the 14,492 cases sentenced in 2003, only 358 (2.4 percent) involved upward
departures in which the defendant did not plead guilty.8
The Commission concluded that Blakely’s modest
impact would be manageable, although it noted that

courts already were overburdened, and any increase in
trials would only add to their overload. The Commission
also recommended a number of procedural changes to
clarify and streamline Blakely’s application to Minnesota
cases, adopting an approach similar to the one used in
Kansas to make that state’s guidelines compliant with
constitutional requirements.9 In May 2005 the Minnesota Legislature adopted the Commission’s proposals
in slightly modified form.10
In retrospect, Blakley’s modest impact in Minnesota
resulted from both the context within which the Commission developed its guidelines and key policy decisions it
made in 1978 and 1979. As discussed more fully below,
the context included strong bipartisan Legislative support
in favor of determinate sentencing and equally strong
opposition to sentencing policies that would cause prison
crowding. The Commission’s policy choices—in particular, its decision to approach guideline development as a
policy-making process rather than an effort to codify past
sentencing practices, and its rejection of “real-offense”
sentencing—resulted in proposed guidelines that lacked
several features that made the federal guidelines highly
vulnerable to Blakely attack.
The Legislature had considered sentencing reform
bills for three sessions before enacting legislation to create the Commission in 1978.11 Leaders built coalitions
that represented both major political parties, as well as
diverse interest groups—law enforcement, prosecutors,
defenders, crime victims, and corrections. In 1975 the
Legislature approved $33 million to build a new 400-bed
high-security prison to provide a level of security that
could not be attained within Minnesota’s aging correctional institutions. The new facility was not intended to
increase total prison capacity—in fact, the original plan
called for closure of 400 beds in older prisons when the
new facility opened. Overruns pushed final costs well
over $40 million and occurred at a time when the state
faced severe revenue shortfalls. In 1978 liberal and conservative legislators were determined not to allocate more
scarce public resources to add prison bed space, and they
directed the Commission to produce a sentencing reform
that would work within the limits of existing prison
capacity.12
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The Commission’s Key Decisions

The Commission’s decisions on four key issues during
guideline development blunted Blakely’s impact on Minnesota many years later. Those decisions were (1) to view
guideline development as a policy-making process, (2) to
use conviction offenses rather than “real” offenses to
determine presumptive sentences, (3) to define a narrow
range of departure criteria, and (4) to promote a low judicial departure rate from the guidelines.
Guideline Development as a Policy-Making Process

The Commission adopted the position that it was making
sentencing policy, not discovering and codifying past sentencing practice. The Commission was acting under a
clear delegation of authority from the Legislature (which
itself could have created sentencing guidelines and
enacted them in statutes) to develop presumptive guidelines. Commission members were appointed by the
governor and chief justice to represent a broad array of
criminal justice interests—trial and appellate judges, prosecutors, defenders, law enforcement, parole, and
corrections—as well as the public. The Commission’s
chairperson was highly skilled in building coalitions and
mediating situations in which groups held divergent positions. In its early deliberations the Commission
distinguished its work from earlier judicially developed
descriptive and voluntary guidelines, wherein judges
viewed their task as identifying past judicial sentencing
patterns and building guidelines to reflect those practices.
In short, the Commission chose to develop “prescriptive”
rather than “descriptive” guidelines. Several of the Commission’s prescriptive policy choices, described below,
resulted in guidelines provisions that are less vulnerable
to Blakely attack.
Conviction versus Real-Offense Sentencing

Important issues were at stake in the Commission’s decision about how to determine the presumptive sentence.
Under past practice, judges were free to consider offenders’ underlying criminal conduct, not just the nominal
offense for which an offender was convicted or to which
they had pleaded guilty. Proponents of real-offense sentencing maintained that under presumptive guidelines,
conviction-offense sentencing would give prosecutors
much greater power to determine sentences by adjusting
their charging and bargaining discretion, effectively shifting sentencing authority from the judge to the prosecutor.
They argued that judges needed real-offense sentencing to
prevent this expansion of prosecutorial sentencing power
and to avoid disparity in the treatment of cases where the
underlying conduct was quite similar but the conviction
offenses differed substantially.
Proponents of conviction-offense sentencing argued
that real-offense sentencing allows prosecutors to offer
charge reductions to obtain guilty pleas and then retract
those bargains by arguing for sentencing based on actual
conduct that was inconsistent with the conviction offense.

These critics also argued that real-offense sentencing
negates the law of evidence, because it allows judges to
consider facts at sentencing that would be inadmissible at
trial, either because the evidence was illegally obtained or
because it is not relevant to the conviction offense. Realoffense sentencing also lowers the standard of proof on
such facts, because they are not subject to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and other trial-procedure safeguards.13
During its early deliberations, the Commission considered whether the presumptive sentences should be based
on conviction or real offenses. However, they deferred a
decision on the matter while they worked to resolve other
issues in guideline construction, including how to rank
the severity of criminal offenses. As it turned out, the
Commission’s deliberations and choices on offense severity rankings helped them to resolve the conviction vs. real
offense issue.
After a failed attempt by staff to lead the entire Commission in an offense severity ranking exercise,14 the
Commission delegated the task to a work group of members co-chaired by the prosecutor and public defender.
This work group developed a ranking process that was
grounded in experience rather than in theory and that
divided deliberations so that workload was more manageable.
The work group began by excluding archaic or rarely
prosecuted felonies from the ranking exercise. Then they
divided remaining felonies into six broad categories—violent, arson, sex offenses, drugs, property crimes, and
miscellaneous. All but the property category contained
twenty or fewer crimes. The work group split property
crimes into three subcategories: forgery, forgery-related,
and theft-related.
The work group decided to fine-tune the statutory
offense definitions by adopting dollar-loss modifiers for a
few crimes in the forgery, forgery-related, and theft-related
categories. These modifiers were identical to dollar-loss
criteria that the Legislature had included as sentencing
factors in the theft statute.15 Hence, on a pragmatic level
the work group found that statutory offense definitions
were a satisfactory and workable basis for the Commission’s ranking of offense severity.16
The work group returned to the Commission with its
new groupings of crimes to resume the ranking exercise.
This involved several steps. First, the Commission
reached agreement on severity rankings within each category. Second, they reached agreement on a severity
ranking that spanned all categories. Finally, they divided
the overall ranking into ten coherent severity levels, which
formed the vertical axis of the sentencing guidelines grid.
In these subsequent steps, members’ arguments were
based on a combination of their experience (gained from
different perspectives within the justice system) and their
values. When debate suggested wide variation in rankings,
members holding extreme positions were called upon to
explain the basis of their positions to the Commission and
to attempt to sway other members to their position.17 The
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Commission did not find it necessary to consider additional information about crimes, not included within
statutory definitions of crimes, to complete its ranking
exercise.
During its earlier considerations several Commission
members expressed reservations about the fairness of realoffense sentencing. Because it now had a workable offense
severity index based on statutory offense definitions, the
Commission quickly reached a decision to use conviction
offenses to determine presumptive sentences. The Commission devoted little additional debate to the
philosophical or operational issues at stake before it
reached this decision. The decision to base presumptive
sentences on conviction offense elements avoided the disadvantages of real-offense sentencing and made the
guidelines relatively simple to apply. By avoiding the use
of frequent case-specific adjustments to calculate sentence
severity, the Commission also limited the number of judicial sentencing findings that are now subject to Blakely
attack.
Narrow Departure Criteria

Later in its deliberations the Commission set policy governing judicial departures from individual convicted offenders’
presumptive sentences. This was a contentious matter
because it directly affected core values and authorities of
judges, prosecutors, and defenders. While the Commission
took several weeks to finalize all aspects of its departure
policy, during their deliberations Commission members
agreed that departures should not be permitted for reasons
that were inconsistent with the statutory definition of the
conviction offense. While this point was never explicitly
stated in the guidelines, one Commission member, a
highly respected judge,18 observed that this position was
essential if the Commission was to preserve the integrity of
its prior policy choice of basing presumptive sentences on
conviction offenses. This judge later became chief justice
of the Minnesota Supreme Court and heavily influenced
case law interpreting application of the guidelines.
Low Departure Rates

The Commission decided that departure rates needed to
be low not only to substantially reduce sentencing disparity but also to achieve the goal of maintaining prison
populations at or below the existing prison capacity.
Matching sentencing policy with available correctional
resources requires accurate predictions of future resource
impacts; high departure rates limit the accuracy of such
impact projections. By the time the Commission completed its work, it was evident that in states with judicially
developed voluntary sentencing guidelines judges
departed freely from the guideline sentences, and that
such guidelines were not reducing disparity.19 Accordingly, the Commission decided to set a high threshold for
departures, stating that guideline sentences were presumed to be appropriate for all cases, and that judges
would need to cite “substantial and compelling” circum-
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stances to overcome that presumption and impose a
departure. The Commission included an illustrative and
nonexclusive list of departure criteria that described rare
but persuasive reasons for departure. These criteria
reflected the Commission’s earlier choices on using conviction offenses to determine presumptive sentences and
prohibiting departures for facts that were inconsistent
with conviction offenses.
Implementation of the Commission’s Policy Choices

The adoption of guidelines required changes in sentencing hearing procedures. One judicial member of the
Commission convened a committee to consider necessary
revisions in Minnesota’s Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and the committee’s recommendations were formally
incorporated into the Rules. As amended, the Rules
require judges to give notice to the state and the defense if
they are considering departing from a presumptive sentence. At the sentencing hearing, both sides are permitted
to present evidence and witnesses and make arguments
on factors that might permit a departure. At the conclusion of this hearing, the judge decides questions of fact
and enters the sentence. If the sentence is a departure, the
guidelines require the judge to state on the record the factors that justified the departure. Under the constitutional
standards that applied prior to the Apprendi-Blakely line of
cases, contested sentencing facts needed to be proved only
by a preponderance of the evidence.
Judges and practitioners accepted most of the Commission’s sentencing policy choices. In the first two years
of guidelines sentencing, judges departed from presumptive dispositions in only 6.2 percent of all cases, with
about equal numbers of aggravated and mitigated departures. This low departure rate reduced variance in judges’
dispositional decisions (compared to pre-guideline practice) by 52 percent.20 Prison populations remained under
prison capacity for the five-year term covered by the Commission’s projections.21
The Commission had no power to enforce its guidelines—that was reserved to the Minnesota Supreme
Court22 (the new Minnesota Court of Appeals did not
begin hearing cases until early 1984, so most of the critical, early guidelines case law was shaped by a single
court). The Commission’s enabling legislation gave both
the state and the defendant the right to appeal any sentence.
Early case law uniformly reinforced the Commission’s
key choices with respect to the use of conviction offenses
to determine presumptive sentences and to determine
appropriate reasons for departures. The Supreme Court
ruled that judges could not enhance a sentence based on
offenses for which the defendant had not been charged or
for which charges had been dropped.23 The Court disallowed departures based on speculation about crimes a
defendant might commit in the future.24 The Court further ruled that judges could not depart on the basis of
alleged crimes to which the defendant maintained his or
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her innocence25 but could depart on the basis of noncharged offenses if the defendant admitted them on the
record.26 The Court also adopted a very deferential standard of review of decisions not to depart;27 this ruling
strongly reinforced the presumption in favor of imposing
the recommended guidelines sentence and made clear
that when unusual circumstances are present judges are
authorized but not required to depart.
The Minnesota guidelines permit departures not only
as to the duration of a prison sentence but also as to “disposition.” An offender with a presumptive executed prison
sentence may instead be given a stayed prison term and
placed on probation (downward dispositional departure),
or an offender with a presumptive stayed prison sentence
may be given an executed prison term (upward dispositional departure). Although the permissible departure
factors in the guidelines as originally written implied that
all departures should be based on increased or decreased
desert, the Minnesota Supreme Court soon recognized
non-desert grounds—but only as to dispositional departures.28 Offenders who are particularly amenable to
probation and/or unamenable to prison can receive downward dispositional departures; offenders who are
particularly unamenable to probation (e.g., because they
have failed on probation in the past) can receive an
upward dispositional departure. In practice, downward
amenability departures are common, but upward departures (the ones now subject to Blakely requirements) are
quite rare; indeed, upward dispositional departure on any
grounds is rare and is usually agreed to by the defendant.29
Departures are often agreed to as part of plea negotiations. Defendants will sometimes agree to an upward
durational departure in order to limit the extent of that
departure; upward durational and/or dispositional departures may also be agreed to in return for dismissal of other
charges, and defendants will sometimes trade an upward
durational departure for a downward dispositional departure. In an early case,30 the Supreme Court held that a plea
agreement is an improper basis for departure. A 1996
case, State v. Givens,31 created at least a limited exception;
the defendant had agreed to an upward durational departure in return for a stayed prison term, and the Court held
that he could not contest the grounds for that departure
when the stay was later revoked. But this ruling was
promptly limited by legislation and disapproving language
in the Guidelines Commentary; the Court then overruled
Givens and held that a plea agreement can never, by itself,
justify an upward dispositional or durational departure.32
Thus, by the time Blakely was decided, courts were once
again required to find aggravated circumstances
(enhanced desert; unamenability to probation) in order to
justify an upward departure. And those findings, unlike
most negotiated departures, are subject to Blakely standards.
Political and sentencing policy developments in Minnesota in recent years have increased the number of

Apprendi (statutory-enhancement) issues but may have
decreased the number of potential Blakely (guidelines
departure) issues. In the past two decades there has been
nearly continuous political and media attention to issues
of crime and sentencing.33 Drug penalties and presumptive sentence durations began to go up in the mid-1980s,
and the late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed substantial
increases in penalties for violent and repeat offending.
The statutory enhancements provided for these offenders
are subject to Apprendi requirements. However, the
increased presumptive guidelines durations may have
reduced the frequency of upward durational departures.
These increases were usually followed by steady or declining upward departure rates, presumably because of the
higher “starting point” provided by the increased presumptive durations.
Minnesota Blakely Case Law

The Minnesota Supreme Court has decided several important Blakely issues. In State v. Shattuck34 the Court held
that upward durational departures under Minnesota’s
guidelines are subject to Blakely requirements. The Court
further held that the invalid upward departure provisions
are severable from the rest of the guidelines and
remanded the case for resentencing. The Court thus
rejected all three of the options considered by Justice
Breyer in his “remedy” opinion in Booker—total invalidity
of the guidelines, excision of all provisions making the
guidelines legally binding, and engrafting onto the guidelines a set of judge-made procedures for jury trial of
aggravating facts.35 In State v. Houston,36 the Court
addressed retroactivity issues, holding that Blakely is a
“new rule” but not a “watershed” new rule; it therefore
applies to all cases still pending on direct review at the
time Blakely was decided (which was the case in Shattuck)
but does not apply to defendants like Houston whose convictions had already become final.
Several early decisions of the Minnesota Court of
Appeals held that Blakely does not apply to upward dispositional departures (executed prison sentence instead
of the presumptive stayed term). In State v Hanf, 37 the
Court reasoned that dispositional departures are based
on offender characteristics, which makes these decisions
unlike the aggravated offense factors at issue in Apprendi
and Blakely and more akin to Blakely-exempt indeterminate sentencing (and/or more akin to prior record,
which relates only to punishment and which is also
exempt from Apprendi-Blakely requirements). The Court
also noted that juries have not traditionally been involved
in choosing sentence dispositions, at least since courts
were granted authority to stay sentences. The Court of
Appeals may have further assumed that while jurors are
equipped to distinguish atypical offense conduct which
increases the deserved sentence duration, they would
have difficulty assessing atypical offender characteristics
which relate to the appropriate sentence disposition.
Exclusion of upward dispositional departures also serves
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to insulate probation revocation decisions from Blakely.
On the other hand, the Appeals Court’s arguments are
inconsistent with the broad language of Blakely, holding
that the “maximum” sentence for Apprendi purposes is
the most severe sentence that the judge may legally
impose “solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the
jury verdict or admitted by the defendant”38 (i.e., without
finding additional facts). In State v. Allen,39 the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted this broader reading and
held that upward dispositional departures are covered by
Blakely.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission’s
Proposed Blakely Modifications

The Sentencing guidelines Commission’s proposed
response to Blakely is a mixture of compliance and avoidance.40 Compliance measures include proposed changes
in pretrial and trial rules, similar to those previously
adopted in Kansas, requiring jury trials of sentenceenhancing facts unless such facts are admitted by the
defendant or the defendant requests the court to make the
findings.41 The Minnesota Legislature agreed with this
recommendation, specifying that a unitary jury trial will
be used unless a bifurcated trial is requested by the prosecutor or the evidence supporting an upward departure is
inadmissible on the elements of the charged offense(s)
and would result in unfair prejudice to the defendant.42
The Commission also added language to the guidelines,
stating that sentencing outside of the guidelines range “is
an exercise of judicial discretion constrained by case law
and appellate review,” and that if aggravated facts are
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, “the judge may exercise the discretion to depart.”43 This language, to which
the Legislature did not object, confirms that even where a
jury has found that aggravated circumstances are present
judges retain discretion not to depart, or to depart by less
than the maximum allowed.
The Commission’s Blakely avoidance strategies seek to
insulate consecutive sentencing from Blakely and to
reduce the number of upward durational departures. The
Commission provided a list of crimes permitting consecutive sentencing, in lieu of the former rule requiring the
court to find that the crimes were “person” offenses.44 As
for departures, the Commission substantially broadened
the cell ranges on the guidelines grid, taking full advantage of the enabling statute provision authorizing ranges
as broad as 15 percent above and below the midpoint.45
The Legislature went further, specifying that cell ranges
should extend 20 percent above the midpoint (and 15 percent below).46 For example, at offense severity level IX
(first-degree criminal sexual conduct; first-degree assault)
the final (legislative) version yields a cell width of twentynine months (74 to 103) at zero criminal history and a cell
width of fifty-four months (135 to 189) at criminal history
of 6 or higher; previously, all cells at level IX had a width
of ten months. These changes will allow sentences to be
enhanced substantially without exceeding the top of the
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cell range and triggering Blakely rights (courts will also
have more discretion to mitigate sentence duration without departing).
Conclusion

The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission’s policy choices and the state Supreme Court’s interpretive
case law have worked together to soften Blakely’s impact
by limiting the number of cases where Blakely might
apply. Presumptive sentences are based almost entirely on
the elements of the conviction offenses, so judges are
rarely required to find additional facts that could increase
the presumptive sentence. Case law strongly reinforced
the Commission’s approach by prohibiting upward departures based on contested facts not included in any
conviction offense and making clear that judges have substantial discretion not to depart even when grounds for
departure exist. This structure has largely survived intact,
despite numerous changes in the guidelines and sentencing statutes. Some of those changes called for additional
sentencing fact-finding subject to Blakely, but other
changes reduced the need for upward departure. The
Blakely-avoiding policy choices made by the Commission
and the Supreme Court have been widely accepted by
Minnesota practitioners and policy makers and have not
been controversial.
Minnesota was the first state to implement sentencing
guidelines written and monitored by an independent sentencing commission.47 The many states that later adopted
such guidelines have generally made similar choices to
avoid or minimize “real-offense” sentencing and have
based their recommended sentences and departure
grounds on conviction offenses. The U.S. Sentencing
Commission took a very different approach, requiring
judges to make frequent factual determinations in computing the presumptive sentence and explicitly permitting
such sentences to be enhanced by facts not included in, or
even closely associated with, the conviction offense. These
choices have made the federal guidelines more severe and
more controversial, and they also make Blakely compliance much more difficult—many more determinations
would have to be made by juries and, at least as the guidelines are currently written, those determinations would
often be highly complex. Federal compliance problems
have been avoided, at least temporarily, by the Supreme
Court’s holding in Booker that the guidelines will be “voluntary” pending congressional review of how to respond
to the new constitutional requirements. It may be that
Congress will take no action; indeed, in the context of the
federal criminal justice system, voluntary guidelines (subject to “reasonableness” review, under Booker) may be the
best version of guidelines that can be implemented. But if
the federal guidelines are ever again to be made legally
binding, they will probably have to be completely rewritten, more along the lines of the simpler,
conviction-offense-based model adopted by Minnesota
and other guidelines states.
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The guidelines model adopted by Minnesota and other
states with legally binding guidelines makes Blakely compliance much easier, but such compliance still imposes some
additional burdens. Will these states accept those burdens?
In Justice O’Connor’s terms,48 will they pay the “constitutional tax” imposed by Blakely? Or will they choose the “easy
out,” offered by Booker, of making their guidelines voluntary? And will other states, when contemplating the
adoption of guidelines, prefer voluntary over legally binding
guidelines so as to avoid Blakely problems? Time will tell.
However, there is reason to believe that states like Minnesota will retain their legally binding guidelines and will
pay the Blakely “tax,” because these states have learned the
value of guidelines which, while preserving substantial
case-level flexibility, produce reasonably uniform and predictable sentences. Voluntary guidelines are unlikely to
produce high enough levels of compliance to achieve these
results, at least in large jurisdictions with prescriptive
rather than purely descriptive guidelines. One of the most
important benefits of more uniform sentencing is the ability to predict future resource impacts and needs. As
pioneered in Minnesota and adopted in most other guidelines states, accurate resource-impact projections permit
policy makers to avoid prison overcrowding, set priorities
in the use of limited and expensive correctional resources,
and make clear to everyone the true costs of particular sentencing policy proposals. These management tools are
critically important to state policy makers who, unlike
their federal counterparts, must balance their budgets and
deal with strongly competing demands for limited state
funds. In the federal system huge budget deficits are the
norm, and correctional expenses are a tiny fraction of the
overall budget. This may be one reason why resourceimpact assessments have never been seriously considered
in formulating federal sentencing policy; it also means
that the switch to voluntary federal sentencing guidelines
will not interfere with such assessments. In state systems,
however, a switch to voluntary guidelines risks depriving
policy makers of a valuable tool upon which they have
come to rely. That risk, combined with the broad support
that state guidelines have generally enjoyed and the relative ease of Blakely compliance, should ensure the survival
of Minnesota-style guidelines.
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classifications and ranking.
For a detailed account of the ranking exercise, see DALE G.
PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA’S SENTENCING GUIDELINES 55-63 (Butterworth 1987).
Douglas K. Amdahl was a trial court judge in Hennepin
County (Minneapolis) when he was appointed to the Commission in 1979. In July 1980, while still on the Commission, he
was named associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme
Court, and in 1982 he was named chief justice. His presence
on the Court helped to ensure that the Court’s decisions reinforced the Commission’s rejection of real-offense departures
(see infra, text at notes 23-26, discussing case law on this
point).
Few studies of voluntary guidelines had been published at
this time, but Commission staff communicated with staff in
states with voluntary sentencing guidelines and with
researchers who were studying their application.
Minn. Sent. Guidelines Comm., The Impact of the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines, Three Year Evaluation (Sept. 1984), p.
34 (comparing “grid variance” measures of dispositional uniformity for the pre-guidelines year of 1978 and the first full
year of guidelines sentencing, 1981). Of course, all sentencing “disparity” measures are relative and value-laden—they
examine sentences given to offenders who are defined as
“similar” relative to the sentencing goals and criteria deemed
most appropriate. Post-guidelines dispositions may have
been more disparate relative to rehabilitative assessments
and offender-risk criteria, but when evaluated relative to the
Commission’s desert-based standards, 1981 dispositions
were less disparate.
See Parent, supra note 17, pp. 177-201.
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The Commission routinely monitored every case sentenced
under the guidelines, and designed a sentencing database
that was integrated into Minnesota’s then-developing
offender-based criminal justice management information system. The Commission provided quick feedback to officials to
support accurate guideline application and used its data to
refine and improve the guidelines over time.
See State v. Brusven, 327 N.W. 2d 591 (Minn. 1982); State v.
Peterson, 329 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Minn. 1981).
See State v. Hagen, 317 N.W.2d 701, 703 (Minn. 1982); State
v. Schantzen, 308 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 1981).
State v. Womack, 319 N.W. 2d 17, 19-20 (Minn. 1982).
See State v. Rott, 313 N.W.2d 574, 575 (Minn. 1981); State v.
Garcia, 302 N.W.2d 643 (Minn. 1981).
State v. Kindem, 313 N.W. 2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981) (stating that
“[although] we do not intend to entirely close the door, it
would be a rare case which would warrant reversal of the
refusal to depart”).
For discussions of this line of cases, see Richard S. Frase,
Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota: 1978-2003, in Crime and
Justice: A Review of Research (M. Tonry, edit.) (2005), vol.
32, pp. 131, 155; Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in
Theory and Practice, in Crime and Justice: A Review of
Research (M. Tonry, edit.) (1997), vol. 22, pp. 363, 399-403.
See Frase, Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 28, at 173, 179,
185; Frase, Sentencing Principles, supra note 28, at 402 n21,
416, See also supra, text at note 8 (discussing Guidelines
Commission data on infrequency of Blakely issues).
State v. Garcia, 302 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 1981).
544 N.W.2d 774, 777 (Minn. 1996).
State v. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d, 65, 71 (Minn. 2002).
See generally Frase, Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 28.
704 N.W.2d 131, (Minn. 2005).
Id. at 143-48. The majority opinion in Shattuck assumed that
the Court had inherent judicial authority to establish jury trial
procedures to comply with Blakely requirements, but it
declined to invoke those powers and engraft jury trial procedures onto the guidelines, preferring to leave that task to the
Legislature. Id. at 148. In a footnote, the Court noted that the
Legislature had recently enacted jury trial and other procedures to comply with Blakely and further noted that these
procedures apply both prospectively and to resentencing
hearings; the Court added: “We express no opinion about
these recent changes, and do not foreclose the district court
[from applying them on remand].” Id. at 148 n 17. (Readers
who may have read the Court’s opinion shortly after it was
handed down on August 18, 2005, are advised to consult the
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amended version. On October 6 the Court issued an order
deleting language requiring imposition of the presumptive
sentence on remand and adding the “we do not foreclose” language to the footnote. [The Court also clarified that it was only
holding Section II.D of the guidelines unconstitutional as
applied.])
702 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 2005).
687 N.W.2d 659, 661-66 (Minn. App. 2004). See also State v.
Saue, 688 N.W.2d 337, 345-46 (Minn. App. 2004). In State v.
Carr, 53 P.3d 843, 844-49 (Kan. 2002), the Kansas Supreme
Court held, on somewhat different grounds, that upward dispositional departures are not subject to Apprendi (and now,
Blakely) requirements. For an argument in favor of distinguishing between offense and offender factors, under Blakely,
see Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Blakely, 17 FED. SENT.
REP. 89 (2004).
Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2537.
__N.W.2d__, 2005 WL 3117280 (Minn. 2005).
Cf. Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and
Constitutional Law at Cross Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082,
1108-18 (2005) (discussing Blakely “approach” and “avoidance” strategies).
Minn. Sent. Guidelines Comm., Long Term Recommendations, supra note 7, at 12-19. See also
http://www.ussc.gov/STATES/blakely/Kansas%20Statute%2
0Post%20Gould.pdf (Kansas changes).
2005 Minn. House File No. 1, Art. 16, Secs. 3 to 6, amending
Minn. Stat. sec. 244.10. The legislation speaks only of
upward departures on the prosecutor’s motion, id., Secs. 3 &
4. The Commission’s report implied that courts could initiate
such departures unless this would violate separation of powers. Minn. Sent. Guidelines Comm., Long Term
Recommendations, supra note 7, at 14.
Minn. Sent. Guidelines Comm., Report to the Legislature (Jan.
2005), p. 11.
Minn. Sent. Guidelines Comm., Long Term Recommendations,
supra note 7, at 18; Minn. Sent. Guidelines Comm., Report to
the Legislature, supra note 43, pp. 6, 13-17.
Minn. Sent. Guidelines Comm., Report to the Legislature,
supra note 43, pp. 6, 17-18.
House File No. 1, Art. 16, Sec. 1. See also
http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/Guidelines/grid05.doc
(revised Minnesota Guidelines grid, eff. Aug. 1, 2005).
See generally Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines:
Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1190 (2005).
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2546 (Justice O’Connor, dissenting).
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